June 2025 – Under The Hammers

West Ham Monday Briefing: Too Quiet On The Transfer Front

With less than seven weeks to go before the big kick-off what is happening to the much needed rebuild at the London Stadium. How skint are we, who will be sold, who will be banned and are we ever going to sign any new players?

It was Kick-Off Day minus 47. The wind howled around the empty, soulless Rush Green portacabins, as dust swirled across the cracked, abandoned car park. A single corner flag flapped rhythmically in the breeze, forgotten when the last training session ended just a few short weeks earlier. Nothing stirred except for an old man and the squeaking wheels of a white line marker in the far distance – otherwise, no life, no sound; only silence and despair.

In one corner, a rusty padlock hung above a door marked ‘Head of Recruitment’. A handwritten paper sign sellotaped to the splintered window read: ‘First Class Players Wanted – All Positions. Please state age, experience and preferred agent.’ Welcome to West Ham in the Transfer Window!

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If You Can’t Convince Them, Confuse Them

A few weeks ago, I published an article on the realities of the financial situation at West Ham. Although, it is now accepted that West Ham had never faced an immediate threat of a PSR breach, the rules continue to be waved around as a portent for troubled times ahead – possibly the 2026/27 season but more probably the one after that. Yet in all likeihood, the existing PSR rules won’t survive that long now that Chelsea have destroyed their credibility.

Not surprisingly, it was in the Board’s interest to point the finger at ‘externally’ imposed rules rather than admit their own mismanagement for the club’s current woes. I had often wondered why the remaining Premier League clubs had voted for PSR in the first place given its major impact was to preserve the rich club status quo. But then you realise that for most, the priority is not to compete with the rich but to maintain their own advantage over those who are newly promoted.

The dilemma in understanding what is going on at West Ham in this age of misinformation is whether what we read has genuinely been leaked by the club, has been misunderstood/ misreported by the messengers or simply been made-up in the interest of internet clicks.

The major talking points in recent weeks have been the suggestion that only 75% of player sales will be made available for purchases, and the hint that a £90 million injection of capital is about to be made by the Board. The former is almost certainly a confusion arising from PSR accounting principles where only the excess of sale price over book value can be shown as player sale profit. I’m guessing that someone has made a back of an envelope calculation that this might equate approximately to 75%. As for the latter, the Board now find themselves in a position where they are obliged to invest further or face the prospect of PSR losses over the next three years being limited to £15 million, rather than £105 million. What form the investment takes, who puts their hands in their pockets, and how the money is used will provide interesting insights into the mindset and intentions of each of the owners.

Such is the dislike and distrust of David Sullivan by many supporters that is has spawned all manner of wacky conspiracy theories. Allegedly the Chairman has a secret plan to get the club relegated as a deliberate act of revenge, making a moonlight flit out of Stratford and baling out of an airplane over the nearest tax haven hugging his parachute payment. Personally, I believe the woeful management of the club is better expalined by Hanlon’s razor which suggests: “never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.” For stupidity, read collective incompetence driven by a gaggle of overblown egos.

What A Waste of Money

It should come as no surprise to many that the effectiveness of West Ham’s transfer spending over the years has been atrocious. Take Declan Rice out the equation and the player trading profits are at the bottom of the league. If there was any lingering doubt, then take a look at the estimates of squad value calculated by the Transfermkt website (below). Not just that West Ham is ranked in 14^th place – despite their relatively high spending – but how far they are behind clubs such as Brighton, Bournemouth and Forest.

1) Man City – €1.35 BN, 2) Chelsea – €1.21BN, 3) Liverpool – €1.09 BN, 4) Arsenal – €1.01BN, 5) Man United – €818 M, 6) Tottenham – €805 M, 7) Brighton – €732 M, 8) Newcastle – €597 M, 9) Aston Villa – €574 M, 10) Bournemouth – €466 M, 11) Nottingham Forest – €444 M, 12) Brentford – €432 M, 13) Crystal Palace – €426 M, 14) West Ham – €370 M, 15) Fulham – €318 M, 16) Wolves – €276 M, 17) Everton – €257 M, 18) Leeds – €211 M, 19) Burnley – €187 M, 20) Sunderland – €137 M

This is no accident or from run of bad luck but a direct consequence of failing to move with the times. Refusing to adopt a professional approach to scouting, recruiting and longer-term planning. Taking the easy option of relying on agents to identify targets rather than trusting the club’s own resources. Paying lip service to the trends of data analytics and appointing experienced football directors in the belief that a bunch of amateurs can do it better.

Profits on player sales is a significant component of football finances – and will continue to be important if/ when squad cost ratios replace PSR. A smarter club in West Ham’s position would have recognised this long ago and planned for the recruitment and development of younger players who can sustain and raise the club out of its current stagnation. It is a strategy that also calls for the setting aside of sentiment. There is an optimum time to sell any player, no matter who they are.

All Quiet On The Transfer Front

As usual the early days of a West Ham transfer window has been all noise and no action. Last summer I made of point of making a note of every player linked to the club but gave up after the list broke through the one hundred barrier.

The backdrop to this summer’s business have been the baffling public announcements of “we’re skint and must sell before we buy.” Quite why anyone would show all their cards before entering into any negotiations is beyond bizarre. Was the intention solely to manage supporter expectations, an attempt to hide behind PSR regulations or something more sinister. Now we know the club’s problem is cash flow (and not PSR), we also know that it is something the Board can quite easily fix – after all they broke it in the first place. The promised £90 million injection – in whatever form it takes – should serve to partially ease the impasse.

We know very little about the direction Graham Potter and Kyle Macaulay’s thoughts. The assumed principles of pursuing younger emerging talent sounds eminently sensible. Hopefully they are locked away in a quiet corner somewhere, methodically poring over the rows and columns of a recruitment spreadsheet. Keeping tabs on the players that the data has identified and preparing the bids to be put forward. But will they be allowed to excel themselves in the transfer window or will their preferred targets end up as more names in the list of the ones who got away? Sacrificed to the rubbish bin of low-ball bids, take-it-or-leave-it offers and DFS style payment terms.

Potter and Macaulay have a massive job on their hands to rebuild the Hammer’s sqaud. If they also to lose Kudus and Paqueta as predicted to fund recruitment the challenge becomes even greater – both in finding the players and subsequenting moulding a team from a bunch of strangers. My preference is that they are shopping in the under £25 to £30 million aisle, prioritising pace and excluding anyone aged 27 or over, except in exceptional circumstances. Otherwise, it will be a case of rinse and repeat when we reach the same time next year, requiring a third consecutive summer reconstruction.

Today, is when the majority of Premier League clubs get to close their accounts (West Ham’s closed at the end of May), so we can expect activity to pick up this week. There may also be last minutes manoeuvrings by any club (e.g. Aston Villa) who find themselves on the cusp of a PSR breach.

In truth, transfer business has been relatively slow across the board, but we have been here before at West Ham. Looking patiently at the clock as the minutes, hours and days tick by. When others start to spend while West Ham sit on their hands, making enquiries, considering targets and preparing talks.

As things stand the Hammers are deep in the ‘conversation’ for relegation. We cannot rely on there being three worse promoted teams again. We have to make ours better. It really is time to act. COYI!

Counting And Spilling The Beans On West Ham United’s Finances

Here we go! The silly season of transfer bids, player wages, contract lengths, amortisation and PSR breeches is upon us. How does this leave West Ham’s Finances. Strong and stable, or in a mess?

The once simple beautiful game has mutated into a strange and complicated beast for its followers in recent years. A plague of over analysis, statistical overload, tactical complexities, formation paralysis, and eccentric rule interpretations requires fans to understand double pivots, false 9s, low blocks, high presses, inverted wingers, box-to-box midfields and whether a player was entitled to go down. But making matters even worse is the need to be a financial wizard, understanding concepts such as profit and sustainability rules, associated party transactions, player amortisation, shareholder loans and squad cost ratios.

As we enter the summer madness of the transfer window, we take a look at the current state of West Ham’s finances and how they compare with selected other clubs.

Revenues – Where Does The Money Come From?

Despite being ranked as a top twenty club in the 2024 world football rich list – a status they will struggle to retain in 2025 in the absence of European competition – a massive gulf remains between West Ham’s income and the ‘rich 6’ of English football. Clubs such as Liverpool and Arsenal are able to generate revenues 2.7 times larger than those currently earned by the Hammers. The gap is impossible to narrow for any club lacking regular Champions League participation; or the financial muscle and ambition to challenge for it.

Broadcasting revenues (the central distribution of funds from the Premier League and UEFA for TV rights and prize money) continue to dominate at West Ham where they account for 60% of all income received. Comparable metrics for Liverpool and Arsenal are 33% and 43% respectively, illustrating how the bigger clubs use their global appeal to drive Matchday and Commercial revenues that dwarf those achieved at the London Stadium.

Although West Ham can boast the second largest matchday attendance in the Premier League, they drop to eighth in terms of matchday revenues, even in a season that saw a creditable Europa League campaign. Average revenue per fan is on a par with Fulham and Brentford, and behind the rich six, Newcastle and Brighton. The move to the London Stadium has not proven to be the money spinner promised and attempts at squeezing more from those attending, removing concessions, or attracting a greater proportion of higher spending casual visitors (tourists) have met with understandable resistance.

Commercial revenues have seen incremental growth through additional or improved sponsorship deals, pre-season tours and retail merchandising, but with a slower rate of growth than broadcasting. However, certain income streams, such as naming rights, food and beverage sales and income from the staging of non-football events, are not available due to the stadium ownership. This is a flip side to Brady’s much heralded ‘deal of the century’ in securing a low rent 99-year lease.

Expenses – Where Is The Money Spent?

The principal, and most high-profile, expenses at a football club are those related to player wages and transfer fees. While wages have increased significantly at West Ham over the years, they rank 9^th in the league overall for staff costs (wages plus player amortisation). Unsurprisingly, these are way below the ‘rich’ clubs but they have also fallen further behind Newcastle and Villa as they pursue their Champions League ambitions. In total staff costs represented 91% of revenues in 2023/24.

To avoid confusion, it is worth taking a moment to consider how transfer fees are accounted for in profit and loss statements. Suppose a player is purchased for £50m on a 5-year contract. The £50m cost will be amortised in the accounts over 5 years at £10m per year, not as a lump sum. This is independent of how the transfer fees is actually paid in practise. For example, the whole fee up front or against a schedule of instalments.

Brighton provides an interesting comparison here. While their wage bill is not far behind those at West Ham, amortisation is significantly lower. A reflection of their strategy of unearthing emerging talent at a lower cost than the lazier West Ham obsession with experience and/ or recruiting players recommended by agents.

With many of the operating expenses at the London Stadium paid for by the stadium owners, other expenses at West Ham are relatively modest. Not owning the stadium possibly also contributes to the club being in the rare position of having no financial debt. They do, however, owe significant amounts in future transfer instalments which we will return to later.

Transfers and Player Amortisation

If there are limited options for West Ham to achieve a significant increase in matchday and commercial revenues – and become less dependent of broadcasting income – then surely, they must pay more attention to generating player trading profits. For reasons best known to the owners, the club has chosen to ignore the model of buying low and selling high pioneered by the likes of Brighton. The policy of recruiting older, already established players and selling later resulted in an average annual player sale profit of just £15.4m in the nine years from 2014-23. A figure that was below the league median in seven of those nine years.

Indeed, it is rare for clubs to achieve operating profits. Most rely heavily on profits from player sales to comply with the Profitability and Sustainability Rules (PSR). West Ham’s poor record on player sales – the direct result of a transfer policy prioritising experienced, older players – has been a consistent drag on the club’s progress.

The reason the sale of Declan Rice was such a massive bonus for West Ham’s accounts is that, as an academy product, he had no ‘book value’. The entire sale proceeds could be shown as pure profit. Just as Rice’s contribution papered over the cracks on the pitch during his last season, his sale may have done the same for the club’s finances. The record profits in 2023/24 were almost entirely down to the one-off sale of a single player.

The financial implications of selling a player who had previously been purchased is not so clear cut. Consider the following example of a player bought two years ago on a five-year contract for £50m.

After the completion of two years, the player has a book value of £30m. If he has been a success and can be sold for £75m then great, a profit of £45m can be shown in the accounts. Conversely (and the more usual West Ham scenario) if the transfer has not worked out and he is sold for less than book value then the negative difference must be recorded as a loss. Thus, selling Gianluca Scamacca and Nikola Vlasic may have brought in some much-needed cash but did not generate any profit, as their transfer fees were aligned with current book values.

PSR and All That

The Athletic recently published a club-by-club table of Premier League PSR positions over the latest three-year period. Although interesting in that it confirmed West Ham did not have an immediate PSR problem (as many suspected), it was also a largely irrelevant rearview mirror exercise given the club’s financial year had already closed on 31 May. Whatever transactions take place this summer will become part of the 2025/26 accounts and factored into the three-year PSR period 2023/24 to 2025/26.

In calculating PSR limits, certain allowable costs (depreciation, woman’s football, youth and community development) are added back in to the profit and loss totals. For West Ham this is estimated at approximately £14m per year. Thus, for PSR purposes, West Ham’s 2023/24 profit would increase to £71m and allow for equivalent losses of up to £170+m in the two subsequent seasons without falling foul of the rules. Beyond that timeframe (once the Rice transfer drops out of the equation), the PSR outlook (assuming it remains) looks bleak unless the club significantly ramps up revenues or increases profits on player sales on a regular basis.

The caveat to the above is that clubs can only lose £15m of their own moneyacross a three-year PSR period. Anything above that, and up to the £105m threshold, must be guaranteed by owners providing ‘secure funding’. According to The Athletic report, the most recent capital injection at West Ham has expired for the purpose of PSR calculation. If the Board (combined wealth £8 billion) do not address this, future PSR consequences would look very serious indeed.

Where Has All The Cash Flow Gone?

When David Sullivan presented the 2023/24 accounts he gushed “It fills me with immense pride, as a steward of this illustrious club, to see West Ham United on solid financial ground, with all profits reinvested into our squad, infrastructure, and local community, providing a strong basis for our ongoing progress and long-term objectives”.

If we are to believe that is true, then why are we now hearing noise about the finances being in a mess? Or that players must be sold before signings can be made? And what exactly are the Board’s long-term objectives?

There is clearly a problem with cash flow that is beyond the hysterical headlines on the usual clickbait sites. There is nothing sinister about the club resorting to receivables finance or revolving credit facilities. They are standard business practices which I’m sure other clubs must also use.

A standout statistic from West Ham finances is that they are among the leaders for transfer fees owed, with a staggering £191m outstanding when the 2023/24 accounts were published. The equivalent figures available for selected other clubs are Brighton £104m, Newcastle £160m, Arsenal £268m and Liverpool £128. In part this will reflect the Hammers activity in the transfer market but may also be the result of holding out for extended payment terms – a kicking the can down the road tactic that anecdotally scuppers many a West Ham deal at the last minute.

And here lies the conundrum. On the face of it, West Ham accounts have shown strong operating cash flows in recent seasons, and the club have successfully cleared all outstanding debts. In a normal business it would be an enviable position; but football is an abnormal business. Clubs are not owned for annual profits but for reasons of prestige, ego, and asset accumulation. In 2007, Forbes valued West Ham at £195m. Last May that had increased to £882. An increase achieved with limited shareholder funding beyond the issue of £125m in shares in 2022/23, much of which was used to reduce debt.

This has left a net funding/ investment in the past 5 years of just £54m, compared to £496m at Villa and £391m at Newcastle. It feels like an act of self-harm if the owners decline to make further investment now both to ease PSR pressures and to assemble a squad capable of competing at the right end of the table. This brings us back to the question of long-term objectives. Does this go any deeper than preserving Premier League status (and hence asset value) as a plodding mid-table team?

What is apparent is that caution gets the better of ambition in the West Ham boardroom. No-one wants a reckless club owner, but some risks are worth taking where the rewards are high. Sound financial management is fine, but a clubs ultimate success lives or dies on its player and management recruitment. As the overall steward of West Ham’s recruitment, I’m not sure whether Sullivan should be ashamed or embarrassed by his record – probably both! Is there any chance of it ever changing? COYI!

So why was 2024/25 a horror season for West Ham?

All season Geoff and I have been writing articles with our thoughts on why West Ham’s season has been so poor and so uninspiring, putting forward our theories. But my friend Stefan King, a massive fan of both West Ham and the band Queen, who also writes horror stories, insists that we have got it all wrong. He sent me his most recent short story to read. He certainly has a very vivid imagination. I thanked him for his work of fiction and he sent me a one word reply. “Fiction?” I’ll leave you to make up your own mind.

“Boleynian Rhapsody – Hammer to Fall”

A tale of profound dread, psychological turmoil, and an ancient force with an insatiable thirst for pain, all cloaked in claret and blue.

The 2024/25 season was not just bad; it was horrific; it was apocalyptic. West Ham didn’t merely lose games; they deteriorated; they decayed from the inside out. The rot wasn’t confined to the results; it permeated the walls, the players’ bodies, and the air.

No one dared to voice it, but something or someone had followed them from the Boleyn Ground. When they demolished the old Boleyn stadium to make way for nearly a thousand dwellings, they believed they were moving forward; progress, the next level, corporate boxes; they would become the best team in the country, in Europe, in the world. But some things, some very ancient things, resent being forgotten. How dare they move!

Legend has it that the Boleyn witch, Anne Boleyna, had a son. A creature that was born wrong, all teeth and shadow. They imprisoned him in the tunnels beneath the Upton Park pitch, feeding him rats. He was born under a blood moon, a night when the veil between worlds was thinnest. He was a creature of darkness, with eyes that glowed like embers and a voice that could freeze the soul. Anne hid him away, knowing that the world would never accept him. She taught him her secrets, and together, they wove a web of power beneath the Boleyn Ground. Every time the Hammers won, they said it was him—howling beneath the turf, sated by the sacrifice. It was dismissed as East End folklore.

Anne Boleyna was no ordinary witch. She was born in the 16th century, a time when fear and superstition ruled the East End. Her mother, a healer, was accused of witchcraft and burned at the stake. Anne, then a child, watched in horror and vowed revenge. She grew up learning the dark arts, mastering spells that could bend reality and summon spirits. Her reputation spread, and soon, she was feared and revered in equal measure. She passed it all to her son.

For a time after the stadium move all was well. Nothing outstanding but it was always going to take time. Then David Moyes had some spectacular results and led them into Europe. Unbelievably a European trophy was secured. But then everything unravelled. The victories ceased, and the nightmares came to the fore. Moyes couldn’t stop the decline, and by the end of 2023-24, he was gone.

A new head coach arrived—Julen Lopetegui from Spain. By November, every player was plagued by night terrors. One gouged his own thigh with a fork muttering, “I must bleed for the badge.” Others vanished during an away trip to the Tottenham Hotspur Stadium. One lost his mind. Security footage showed his ghost wandering onto the pitch alone in the dead of night. He was rarely seen in good form again.

December arrived with a visit to Leicester. A goal down in under two minutes. Another defeat. Some of the travelling West Ham supporters turned on manager Julen Lopetegui, jeering at him towards the end of the game. Home or away it made no difference. The season was turning into a nightmare.

The year ended with a 5-0 home defeat to Champions-Elect Liverpool. Fans began disappearing before the end of the game. At first, it was those seated in the Trevor Brooking Stand. Then entire rows throughout the stadium. Empty seats, still warm, coats and phones left behind. The official explanation? “Evacuations due to a fire alarm.” But nobody heard an alarm. The footage revealed something else, figures crawling up from the touchline. Pale and long-limbed, wearing kits from the ’60s. Former players. Faces familiar from grainy black-and-white films, but distorted. Skin stretched too tight. Eyes set too deep. Moving with that horrible jerky grace, like puppets at the end of rusty wires.

Then came the fog. It rolled in one day during training, low and dense, smelling like you wouldn’t believe. It was thick and oppressive, wrapping around the players like a shroud. Once it touched someone, they were never the same. They spoke strangely, moved differently. One player bit a goalpost and laughed and laughed until his jaw unhinged. Another began scratching marks into the dressing room tiles. The fog carried whispers, voices from the past, echoing through the corridors of the London Stadium. It was as if the fog was alive, a force that fed on fear and despair.

The players’ experiences grew increasingly harrowing. Night after night, they were tormented by visions of the witch and her son. Some players reported seeing shadowy figures lurking in the corners of their rooms, whispering secrets in a language they couldn’t understand. Others woke up with unexplained bruises and scratches, as if they had been in a struggle. The team doctor was baffled, unable to find any medical explanation for their symptoms.

During training sessions, the players moved like automatons, their eyes vacant and their movements stiff. They spoke in hushed tones, afraid to voice their fears. One player, in a fit of desperation, tried to flee the stadium, only to be found hours later, wandering the streets of Stratford, muttering incoherently about the witch’s curse. Another player, who was once the star striker, refused to step onto the pitch, claiming he could hear the witch’s laughter every time he touched the ball. What chance of him ever scoring any goals again?

The head coach was found in his office one morning, kneeling within a circle of matchday programmes, that he refused to leave. He had written one phrase over and over on the whiteboard: “She demands the chant. I can’t leave the circle until she hears the chant.” But what chant? He didn’t know the chant.

It surfaced once, on a social media recording by a fan before the servers mysteriously crashed: “Come on you Irons, bleed for her name, forge us in fire and burn in her flame.” The clip was deleted within minutes. The fan who uploaded it went missing. His flat, newly built above the old Upton Park pitch, was found empty except for a claret and blue scarf tied into a noose and a puddle of water on the floor—still rippling, forever rippling.

A new head coach arrived. But did things improve? By April, the club was dead in the water. But not relegated. They would fight another day. But what would 2025-26 bring? Fortunately, Ipswich, Leicester, and Southampton were also having nightmares.

It was as if, for one whole season, West Ham United had never existed. But the London Stadium still stands. You can hear it at night. That chant. Warped and slow, echoing out into the empty Stratford streets and the surrounding Olympic Park.

Some say if you get too close, you’ll see lights on in the stands at night when the stadium is empty. You’ll hear boots on the turf. A final match being played in the shadows, for no one and everyone. They say the witch watches from the boxes now. Forever smiling and waiting for kick-off.

The great Queen song “Hammer to Fall” can be heard repeatedly through the PA system.

But the Hammer never truly falls.

It just waits to rise again.