Supporting West Ham has never been a pursuit for the glory hunter or the faint of heart. For most it is an act of faith founded on community, shared identity, loyalty, passion, a sense of belonging, and wherever possible, entertainment. It is not, sadly, a vision shared by the owners.
There can be no argument that English topflight football has changed over the years – some good, some bad – with its global appeal. TV deals, influx of money, overseas players and financial regulations. Where well-run clubs have innovated and adapted to these new realities, the leadership at West Ham has refused to shift, preferring to the celebrate their amateurism and defy progress. Compounding the unpopular handling of the stadium move with an approach to football that rarely looks beyond the next fixture. The added irony being that the cost cutting London Stadium agreement – feted by pundits as the ‘deal of the century’ at the time – now sits like a millstone around the club’s neck to limit the much needed matchday and commercial revenues that are growing rapidly at rival clubs.
There is a concept known (appropriately) as Maslow’s Hammer which states that “if the only tool you have is a hammer, then every problem will look like a nail.” In a West Ham context, this translates to a belief that all performance issues can be addressed by the mirage of a new managerial appointment. Nothing else in the slipshop way the club is run ever needs to change!
The result for supporters is a cycle of chronic anxiety. A Groundhog Day where each new manager enjoys a honeymoon period of variable length, inevitably followed by a steady decline of fluctuating velocity. A decline characterised by a campaign of undermining, leaks and sabotage from the Boardroom. The best-case scenario (for the club) is a manager who makes it through to the end of their contract before being terminated (Allardyce, Moyes). But more usually, they will be fired whenever the spectre of relegation (and financial Armageddon) appears on the horizon.
If you toss a box of assorted West Ham Premier League statistics into the air, what you get when they land is a picture of prolonged mediocrity. Averaged across 29 seasons, the return from 38 matches is 12½ wins, 9½ draws, and 16 defeats: a total of 47 points, negative 8 goal difference, with an expected 11th or 12th place finish. An optimist might interpret this as prudence and stability but really, what is the point of a survival only strategy when it is at the expense of entertainment, ambition and a raucous matchday experience.
In truth, the stats show little difference between the pre and post GSB eras. The only significant distinction being that the current owners have spent a lot more money and made a much bigger song and dance of how incompetent they are.
It would be unfair not to recognise that above average seasons do ocasionally arise: 2015/16 and 2020/21 are notable examples. But where these have occurred, they are the result of temporary good fortune rather than years of good stewardship, squad building and team planning. In 2015/16, Slaven Bilic was able to overlay the mercurial talents of Dimitri Payet onto the organisation inherited from BFS. In 2020/21, David Moyes had the emergence of Declan Rice and the inspiration of Jesse Lingard to turn trademark defensive caution into surprising attacking threat. Both false dawns which failed to survive the loss of key players.
So, what does all this mean for Nuno Espirito Santo as the latest occupant of the West Ham hot seat? Can he break the spell of mediocrity? Implement a style of play that supporters desire and are happy to pay to watch – entertaining, fast paced, front foot, quick transition football? I’d like to think he can but ask me again at the end of November for confirmation. He has been saying many of the right things, has been prepared to take a serious look at the younger players, and is much easier to listen to than his immediate predecessors.
But sorting out West Ham from where they are now is a Herculean task. In fact, Hercules himself would have to think twice before choosing whether to accept the mission or not. How to stabilise a careless defence, inject creativity into midfield, solve the age-old striker conundrum alongside other heroic labours such as pacifying the two-faced bull of Theydon, appeasing the multi-headed serpent of Knightsbridge – and complying with PSR regulations?
Following the hard-fought and well-deserved draw at Everton, a trip to the Emirates to face Arsenal was always going to be a tough ask. Several online commentators saw it as the typical West Ham capitulation against one of the rich six clubs. That Nuno’s approach had been as negative as those who had gone before. This was rather harsh in the context of facing (probably) the best team in the league at the moment, with only a week in post to prepare. But it is difficult to counter claims that West Ham had surrendered the game without putting up much in the way of a fight. Yet for once caution made sense. A gung-ho approach and a five or six goal hammering would have been in no-one’s interest at this stage of proceedings.
Defensively, West Ham managed to maintain good shape and discipline for much of the first half. But it requires an extreme level of luck to keep your goal intact for extended periods without an out-ball to relieve the pressure. Curiously, Max Kilman and Dinos Mavropanos may have put in their most assured performances of the season in helping to counter the host’s legendary set piece threat.
But going forward, West Ham were impotent. The full backs were unable to get out of their own half or support attacks in the way they had at Everton. But it was in midfield where the Hammers were most ineffective in transition. No-one capable of finding space, assuming control and picking the right pass.
It is a stretch on current performances to look at the pairing of Lucas Paqueta and Mateus Fernandes and be satisfied that you are seeing £100 m of creative talent. Paqueta is either too busy looking to buy a foul or making blind, hopeful passes while Fernandes has shown none of the ball carrying skills or creative passing that were advertised on his CV. Maybe it needs time for them to click but both appear to prefer playing in deeper positions than the team requires. It was only Crysencio Summerville who looked capable of the movement and quick control to create his own space and drive forward. Would he be better deployed as a Number 10 than on the wing?
It is becoming increasingly difficult to pinpoint how Niclas Fullkrug can be integrated into a Premier League side hoping to rely on rapid counter attacking. His inclination is to drop deep during build up play rather than looking to put himself about in the box. More in the style of a Haller or Scamacca than the Michail Antonio/ Chris Wood blunt instrument that is better suited to this style of play.
It was interesting to see Nuno opt for Callum Marshall when Fullkrug was replaced. It would have been a thankless task for anyone, but he showed plenty of energy and it was great that he got his first Premier League minutes under the belt. Marshall doesn’t look lone central striker material to me, so his opportunities may remain limited for now. That he was given the opportunity at all was a positive we can take from Nuno’s involvement.
The six matches following the international break will carry great significance for West Ham’s season. Collecting at least nine or ten points must be a realistic target to aim for if respectability is to be achieved and a relegation battle avoided.
With Premier League clubs looking likely to extend the current PSR regulations into the 2026/27 season – mainly because they can’t agree any alternative – next summer is already looking problematic for West Ham. Nuno will clearly want. need reinforcements but flat or falling revenues will likely require profit from player sales to offset operating losses. Unfortunately, there are few high-ticket assets available for sale. COYI!
Under The Hammers 